This paper provides a simple model of corruption dynamics with the ratchet effect. As in Shleifer and Vishny [1993], we consider the sale of government property (entry permit) by government officials as the prototype of corruption activities. In a dynamic version of the Shleifer-Vishny model, corrupt officials have ex post the incentive to price discriminate entrepreneurs based on the entry decisions made in an earlier period. We show that the inability of government officials to commit to future money demands induces the ratchet effect in that entrepreneurs have incentives to delay entry in order to receive a discount in the permit price later. The ex post opportunism erodes the official's extortion power and reduces his revenues from selling permits. Even though the dynamic setting leaves the corrupt official with less extortion power, we cannot rule out the possibility that the official's ability to apply dynamic discrimination decreases the intertemporal aggregate social welfare. We also explore the effect of the official's tenure stability on the extent of corruption. This allows us to identify circumstances under which the often observed practice of job rotation can help mitigate corruption.
I. Introduction
This paper is concerned with the dynamics of corruption. We analyze a dynamic version of Shleifer and Vishny's [1993] model of corruption where the sale of government property (entry permit) by government officials is considered as the prototype of corruption activities. 1 In our two-period model of corruption, entrepreneurs are required to purchase a license from a corrupt official to open a shop. Our dynamic model departs from Shleifer and Vishny in that the official may require the renewal of the license at a fee in the second period.
2 Moreover, the corrupt official is allowed to induce more entry in the second period. In such a setting, corrupt officials have ex post the incentive to price discriminate entrepreneurs based on the entry decisions made in the earlier period. We show that the inability of government officials to commit to future demands entails the ratchet effect in that entrepreneurs have the incentive to delay entry into the market in order to receive a discount in the permit price later (Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole, 1985; Laffont and Tirole, 1988) .
The ex post opportunism erodes the official's monopoly power and reduces his overall revenues from selling permits. The effect of ex post opportunism on the aggregate social welfare, however, is ambiguous. In the second period, the official typically induces more entry compared to the commitment solution by giving a discount to new entrants. Thus, the second period welfare is higher when the official is unable to commit to future demands. The discount, however, provides incentives to delay entry for potential entrepreneurs, resulting in less entry in the first period compared to the commitment solution. As a result, the first period welfare is lower without commitment power. The overall effect on the aggregate social welfare thus depends on the relative magnitude of these two countervailing effects.
We also explore the effect of the official's tenure stability on the extent of corruption.
The question here is whether the often observed practice of job rotation can help mitigate corruption. If a corrupt official is replaced, this will not only affect his own initial strategy, but the outcome will also depend on the new official's information structure. Whether job rotation is beneficial from a welfare point of view finally depends on whether the new (corrupt) official can distinguish in his extortion activities between established firms and new entrants.
Elsewhere in Choi and Thum (1998) , we adopt the same type of two-period model to study corruption dynamics. However, our earlier paper is different from the current one in two important aspects. Firstly, these two papers employ different assumptions about the information structure the government official has in the second period about individual entrepreneurs. The earlier paper assumes that the entrepreneurs are anonymous in that the existing firms can disguise themselves as new entrants if any discounts are offered to new entrants, whereas the current paper considers the case of identified entrepreneurs. Thus, the official in Choi and Thum (1998) cannot price discriminate against the first period entrants in the second period. This implies that there is no ratchet effect; there are no incentives for the entrepreneurs to delay their entry to disguise as low types in order to elicit the discount later.
Secondly, Choi and Thum (1998) analyse a different type of ex post opportunism facing the government official. More specifically, there are sunk investments associated with the initial entry. We ask whether the government officials' ex post opportunism to demand more once entrepreneurs have made sunk investments entails further distortion in resource allocations. We initially show that the inability of government officials to commit to future demands does not distort entry decisions any further if the choice of technology is not a decision variable for the entrepreneurs. The government official can properly discount the initial demand in order to induce the appropriate amount of entry. If, however, the choice of technology is left to the entrepreneurs, the dynamic path of demand schedules will induce entrepreneurs to adopt an inefficient "fly-by-night" strategy. They will choose a technology with inefficiently low sunk cost components, which allows them to react more flexibly to future demands from corrupt officials. We characterise the equilibrium behaviour of the government officials and the entrepreneurs' technology choices. In particular, we show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium. Once entry decisions are made by entrepreneurs, the government officials' optimal strategy is to demand varying amounts of money. This provides a new interpretation of the arbitrariness that entrepreneurs often face in a corrupt environment; 3 uncertainty is simply an equilibrium property of repeated extortion.
Both of our papers build on the works by Shleifer and Vishny [1993] and Bliss and Di Tella [1997] . Shleifer and Vishny's main concern is to investigate how the harmful effects of corruption depend on "the industrial organization of corruption." They argue that when corruption activities are decentralised, the harmful effects of corruption are accentuated. As different agencies set their bribery demands independently in order to maximise their own revenue, they do not take the negative externalities on other agencies' revenues into account. Bliss and Di Tella [1997] investigate the relationship between market competition and corruption. They recognise that the extent of competition is not an exogenous parameter since corruption itself can affect the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium through the endogenously determined level of graft. In a model where the level of corruption and the extent of entry are co-determined by what they call "deep competition" parameters, they show that there is no simple relationship between competition and corruption, thus questioning the validity of a commonly held belief that competitive pressures in the market can mitigate corruption. Our papers are concerned with dynamic aspects of corruption. We extend the analysis to a dynamic situation where the official who has previously collected the bribe comes back to demand more to explore implications of the official's ex post opportunism.
The remainder of the paper is organised in the following way. In Section II, we set up the basic model of corruption dynamics with the ratchet effect. We characterise the time-consistent demand schedule for the official and equilibrium entry dynamics for the entrepreneurs. The effect of the ratchet effect on the intertemporal aggregate welfare is also analysed. In Section III,
we extend the basic model to explore the effect of the official's tenure stability on the extent of corruption. Section IV contains concluding remarks.
3 See, e.g., Klitgaard (1990) for various accounts of this type of uncertainty for investors.
II. The Basic Model of Corruption Dynamics
We develop a two-period model of corruption dynamics. Consider a government official who has the power to issue licenses that allow entrepreneurs to open a shop. 4 The official sets the price of the license to maximise revenues from licensing.
Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their ability to generate (net) income in each period, denoted by v. Let us normalise the total population of entrepreneurs to unity. The distribution of abilities is given by the inverse cumulative distribution function F(v) with continuous density Stigler (1971), "[t] he state has one basic resource which in pure principle is not shared with even the mightiest of its citizens: the power to coerce." The state's monopoly on coercion can lead to the abuse of power when public officials have wide discretion and little accountability due to the lack of formal checks and balances [World Bank (1997)] . 5 This assumption is made without any loss of generality since we can interpret v as the income generated net of any operating cost.
This one-to-one relationship between the monetary demand and the marginal type allows us to use the marginal type v as the control variable for the government official, which turns out to be more convenient for later analysis:
The first order condition for the marginal entrant v, which in turn determines the number of entrants ) (v F , is given by:
We make the standard assumption that the distribution of types satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, that is, -F´/F is increasing:
This assumption ensures that the official's objective function is quasi-concave and the second order condition for the maximisation problem is satisfied:
Let v* as implicitly defined by (2) be the solution to the above problem, i.e.,
Then, the marginal entrepreneur is * v and the number of entrants is given by *) (v F . The official demands * * v m = for the license.
II.2 The Dynamic Problem with Commitment
We now consider a dynamic (two-period) problem where the official can come back to demand more in the second period. The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the first period, the 6 Using the first order condition, we can rewrite the second order condition as 0
The second order condition holds if the distribution F satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition. This condition is a standard assumption in the incentive literature and is satisfied by most widely used distributions; see Fudenberg and Tirole [1991, p. 267]. official demands m 1 as a licensee fee for opening a business. Potential entrepreneurs know their own type (v) and decide whether or not to enter. In the second period, the official can demand more money. We assume that the entrepreneurs who entered in the first period are identified; the existing firms cannot disguise themselves as new entrants if any discounts are offered to new entrants.
7 This informational assumption implies that the official can charge different prices for the right to operate in the second period between existing (old) firms ( official ex post has the incentive to exploit those who entered in the first period since they have revealed that they are high type entrepreneurs. This updated information in the second period allows the official to price discriminate against the first-period entrants, charging them a higher price while setting a lower price for new entrants. In this setting, we ask how the official's ex post opportunism to utilise his new information for price discrimination influences the entry behavior of entrepreneurs.
Before answering the question above, however, we first consider the counterfactual case where the official can commit to his future demand in the first period before the entry decisions are made. We establish that the optimum in the commitment case is essentially the replication of the static solution with the same number of firms in both periods. 
.
In the first period, entrepreneurs with type v will enter if the following two conditions are satisfied:
) is the discount factor. The first condition (IR) is the individual rationality condition. The second one (IC) is the incentive compatibility condition which states that entry in the first period is more profitable than delayed entry in the second period. 
Thus, the government official's revenue as a function of the marginal types in each period can be written as Since the official is assumed to be able to distinguish the existing entrepreneurs from potential new entrants, he solves two separate problems.
For potential new entrants, the maximisation problem for the official can be written as:
The demand for entry permit from the new entrants is represented by the "truncated demand
That is, Φ(v 1 ) satisfies the following first order condition:
Note that our assumption about the monotone hazard rate condition also implies that the
is increasing for all v 1 , ensuring that the second order condition for the maximisation problem is satisfied and Φ(v 1 ) is well defined. 10 Given v 1 , the optimal entry configuration for new entrants in the second period is thus:
The indirect revenue function for the official from new entrants is given by
For future reference, we observe that the total differentiation of (9) yields:
From the monotone hazard rate condition [see (3)], we know that
Since F(∞) = 0, we have Φ(∞) = v* [see Eq. (9)]. Thus, for any number of entrants in the first period, the marginal new entrant in the second period has a lower revenue than the marginal entrant in the case with commitment: Φ(v 1 ) < v* for any v 1 . This implies that the total number of firms in the second period is larger than in the commitment scenario.
For the existing entrepreneurs, the official's maximisation problem is:
Thus, the optimal entry configuration for the existing entrepreneurs is:
The indirect revenue function for the official from existing entrepreneurs is given by
Proposition 2. In equilibrium without commitment, there is no exit in the second period, that is, Proof. The official's overall revenue in present value can be written as: 
Substituting (11), (14) and (16) into (15) yields:
11 To sign the expression, recall that the second order condition in (4) requires the denominator to be negative. [Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole (1985) ].
By entering in the first period, entrepreneurs reveal their ability to generate high incomes and consequently are subject to adverse "price discrimination" in the second period. Entrepreneurs thus deliberately delay their entry to take advantage of the lower license price offered to new entrants in the future.
As is standard in the time consistency literature the ex post flexibility, i.e. the official's ability to adjust his demands based on newly available information, actually hurts him in terms of revenues he can collect [see, for instance, Tirole (1988) ]; the official's dynamic monopoly power is undermined by his own ability to price discriminate based on entry history. The loss of monopoly power, however, does not automatically translate into welfare gains in comparison to the commitment case. Compared to the commitment case, there is less entry in the first period (v 1 > v*). The first period welfare thus is lower in the no commitment case. However, there are more entrants in the second period (v 2 < v*); hence, second period welfare is higher in the no commitment case. The overall impacts of ex post flexibility on the intertemporal aggregate welfare depends on the relative magnitude of these two countervailing effects. To demonstrate the ambiguity of the welfare consequences, we consider two cases, linear and kinked demand for entry. For simplicity, we assume that δ=1. 
Example 1. The Linear Demand Case
Suppose that the entrepreneur types are distributed uniformly on the unit interval
. In this case, we can easily verify that Φ(v 1 ) = v 1 /2 and In contrast, when the government official can commit to future demand, the marginal entrant is the same across periods with v 1 = v 2 = 1/2. The welfare with commitment power is given by:
Thus, with a uniform distribution, social welfare increases as the government official loses dynamic monopoly power.
Example 2. The Kinked Demand Case
To demonstrate that the welfare effect of commitment is ambiguous, we simply introduce a kink in the demand for entry. 13 Suppose that the distribution function is given by
The example is illustrated in Figure 2 . As it is more convenient to use the number of entrants as a choice variable in this example, the number of entrepreneurs who can generate income of at least v in each period is denoted on the horizontal axis. Let n 1 = F(v 1 ) be the number of entrants in the first period. Then, given n 1 , the government official's problem in the second period can be written as:
where n 2 is the total number of entrants in the second period and ) ( 1 1 n v is the marginal firstperiod entrant's willingness to pay [
. From the first-order condition we get:
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Figure 2. Linear and Kinked Demand for Entry
That is, with the kinked demand curve chosen here the government official induces secondperiod entry of at least ¾, which would be the number of entrants with commitment. The bribes charges from new entrants amount to
Now we can turn to the first period. With δ=1, Eq. (6) can be written as 
The first-order condition yields:
In our simple example, it is not even necessary to calculate explicitly the welfare levels with and without commitment power of the corrupt official. Without commitment, the government allows half of the firms to enter in the first period and another quarter of the firms in the second period.
With commitment, it is easy to see that it is optimal to have three quarters of the firms in for both periods. Hence, the number of firms is the same in the second period for both scenarios but is lower in the first period without commitment (½ instead of ¾). Thus, with the kinked demand function, social welfare decreases when the corrupt government official loses commitment power.
III. Job Rotation and the Dynamics of Corruption
One practice often observed in various organisations is job rotation. 14 This practice can be puzzling, since transferring individuals to new jobs sacrifices job-specific human capital (Ickes and Samuelson, 1987) . One prominent explanation is that job transfers prevent corruption by ensuring that employees do not occupy a job long enough to reap the benefits of corrupt activities. 15 In this section, we investigate the implications of job rotation for the dynamics of corruption in our model.
14 Job rotation, for instance, is observed in planned enterprises in the former Soviet Union, the U.S. foreign service and military. 15 Other explanations for job transfers include mitigating the ratchet effect, sorting employees into the jobs where they will be the most productive and allowing potential future managers to gain familiarity with various aspects of an organisation's operations. See Ickes and Samuelson (1987) for details.
Let us parameterise the frequency of job rotation by β, which is the probability that the official will remain in the same position in the second period. For the purpose of maximizing license revenue, β plays the role of a discount factor for the official. If there is a job transfer, the office is assumed to be occupied by another corrupt official. For simplicity, we ignore discounting by setting δ=1. We consider two scenarios depending on the information structure assumed for the new official. In the first scenario, the new official can distinguish between old and new firms, whereas he cannot in the second scenario.
III.1. First Period Entrants Identified by the New Official
This case analyses a situation where the new official enjoys the same information as the old official. It corresponds to a situation where the identities of entrants are publicly available. In this case, the change of power is irrelevant for the entrepreneurs while it affects directly the original corrupt official, who is transferred elsewhere. With this information structure, the second period demands will be independent of who is in power. Once again, it can be shown that the optimal strategy in the second period is to extract the whole surplus of the marginal type who entered in the first period without inducing any exit. 16 Thus, the marginal type in the first period is given by ) ( 1
with δ=1. Hence, we have 1 m = Φ(v 1 ).
The maximisation problem for the official in the first period is then:
The first order condition is given by:
Totally differentiating Eq. (19) with respect to v 1 and β yields: 16 The reason is that the official in the first period never finds it optimal to induce entry level such that v 1 ≤v*. 
, which is increasing in β. In such a case, the practice of job rotation can be justified as an instrument of reducing the harmful effects of corruption. If any job-specific human capital is involved, the optimal job design in an organisation requires that the probability of job rotation β be chosen to trade off the benefit of thwarting corruption against the loss of human capital.
III.2. First Period Entrants Not Identified by the New Official
This case analyses a situation where the new official has no information concerning the identities of entrants in the first period. It corresponds to a situation where the identities of entrants are not publicly available and thus price discrimination based on entry history is not possible for the new official. In this case, the change of power is also relevant for the entrepreneurs. When the new official comes in, he will solve the static optimisation problem and will charge v*. Thus, the marginal type in the first period is given by:
The relationship between the first period monetary demand 1 m and the marginal type 1 v is 1 m = (1− β) v 1 + β Φ(v 1 ). The maximisation problem for the official in the first period is then:
. The first order condition is given by:
Totally differentiating Eq. (19) with respect to v 1 and β yields:
where [s.o.c] denotes the second order condition for (21) and is negative. Since
. In this case, an increase in the frequency of job rotation (a lower β) unambiguously induces more entrants in the first period. In the event of job rotation, however, the new official lacks the information to price discriminate in the second period. As a result, he will solve the static maximisation problem and will induce F(v*) entrants in the second period independent of entry configuration in the first period. In the second period, the number of entrants with a new official is less than the number of entrants in the event that the old official retains his job, F(Φ(v 1 )), for any v 1 . The overall effect of job rotation on welfare is thus ambiguous. If the new official cannot identify who entered in the first period, the practice of job rotation, in a sense, mimics the outcome under commitment in that there is no price discrimination in the second period. We can conclude that if the intertemporal aggregate welfare is higher under the commitment regime, job rotation will be beneficial. In contrast, if the intertemporal aggregate welfare is higher under the no commitment regime, job rotation can be harmful.
In light of our earlier welfare result in Section II, we can conclude that job rotation is harmful in the uniform distribution case if the new official lacks the information concerning the identities of the first period entrants. Thus, we have a completely opposite result compared to the case where the new official can identify the first period entrants; there, job rotation was beneficial. These results suggest that the welfare consequences of job rotation in the dynamics of corruption hinge crucially on the information structure facing the new official.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analysed the dynamics of corruption when the official can identify which entrepreneurs have entered in the first period and can discriminate on the basis of entry history in the second period. We demonstrated that the entry dynamics are characterized by the ratchet effect in that entrepreneurs deliberately delay their entry to take advantage of a lower license price offered for new entrants in the future. We also analysed the effects of the ratchet effect on the intertemporal aggregate welfare. In addition, we explored the effect of the official's tenure stability on the extent of corruption. We identified circumstances under which the often observed practice of job rotation can help mitigate corruption.
We showed that the inability of government officials to commit to future demands erodes the official's extortion power and reduces his revenues from selling permits. This result has implications for the official's choice of information structure. Suppose that the official has some control over the information structure through his decision concerning whether or not to monitor individual entrepreneurs. Import licenses, for instance, can be made anonymous by granting entrepreneurs the right to resell them in the secondary market. Thus, a corrupt official may deliberately choose a way of extortion that does not allow himself to keep track of extorted entrepreneurs over time. Our result suggests that the "anonymous" information structure analysed in Choi and Thum (1998) may arise endogenously.
